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The ideal of independent living for disabled people, although it has political cachet for a society committed to the values of economic independence and self-reliance, represents an over-simplified distortion of the social experiences of disabled and non-disabled people alike and of the complex moral questions arising out of these experiences. However, to understand the ideal of independent living it is important first to examine what is socially constructed as ‘the problem of dependency’ – and herein lies the origins of what I will call ‘the myth of independent living’. 









The problem of dependency: policy-makers

In general, dependency can be defined as: the state in which a person or group relies upon the activities of another to meet their needs in a way that broadly conforms to societal norms. Separate from questions concerning the definition of normality and how this affects understandings of need,​[1]​ the degree to which a relationship is dependent is usually in inverse proportion to the level of reciprocity that is perceived to exist within that relationship. Reciprocity, in turn, refers to the degree to which the dependent person can in some way return or repay the goods and benefits received. These ‘returns’ or ‘repayments’ will not necessarily be identical in form to the benefits or goods received but can instead be ‘equivalent’ to them in some way – whether this equivalence is related to the benefits received or to the cost to the person returning or repaying.​[2]​ Therefore, in its paradigmatic form, the dependent relationship is one where the dependent group/individual is understood as unable to reciprocate at all in relation to the ‘donor’ group/individual. In less extreme cases, the dependency may be understood as allowing (even demanding) reciprocation in some form but that the outcomes relating to need fulfilment, for the dependent group/individual, are still reliant upon the donor group/individual behaving in particular ways. 

The ‘problem’ of dependency is understood by policy-makers in a number of different contexts but is constructed as symptomatic of both extreme and less extreme cases. For example, severely disabled people are often perceived as being entirely dependent upon the activities of non-disabled people to meet their needs. As such the dependency in this case is understood as a problem, to be solved often by reference to some kind of re-distributive principle between the ‘better-off’ (non-disabled) and the ‘worst-off’ (disabled) – where the needs of the latter are justifiably met at the expense of the former.​[3]​ Moreover, because of the extreme dependency, the distributive principle usually comes with no conditions attached, except that the dependent person is able to prove her status as severely disabled.​[4]​  In less extreme cases, the dependency is often understood either as temporary and/or that the dependent person is able to do something herself to relieve the dependency. Solo parents, for example, are often defined as being ‘welfare dependent’ but with fairly stringent conditions being placed on the payment of social security benefits to encourage the claimant to change her dependent condition.​[5]​ Here the social problem to be solved is not only how best to meet the needs of the dependent person and her family members, but how that person can move from a state of economic dependence to independence – the latter condition being seen as more morally desirable than the former. Moreover, once this is achieved, not only are proper moral relations restored according to this particular social construction of the ‘dependency problem’, but it is understood as more likely that the former-dependent will experience less poverty for her and her family as a result.

There are additional dynamics within the social construction of the ‘problem of dependency’, which not only reflect some of the differences (so perceived) between the above cases, but also reflect a distinction frequently made by contemporary social theorists and social policy commentators. Namely, social problems are often constructed either as ‘public’ problems to be ‘solved’ by public agencies and institutions, or as ‘private’ problems to be ‘solved’ by individuals, families and perhaps local neighbourhoods or communities.​[6]​ In relation to the problem of dependency, for example, many policy-makers from the right, implicitly or explicitly, have identified as problematic the dependency that exists between strangers but as non-problematic (or at least less problematic) the dependency that exist within families, friendships and neighbourhoods.​[7]​ Economic dependency between strangers is socially constructed as a social or public problem, whereas the latter types of dependency is understood as individual, private or localised concerns to be dealt with accordingly. 

It is at this point that fairly rigid demarcations are often made between what is defined as appropriately prioritised domains of responsibility. In the first place, the individual is seen as prima facie morally obliged to be self-supporting, often via the activity of paid-work. However, if the individual is not able to fulfil these obligations (due, say, to a severe disability) her family and more immediate community is then obliged to act as ‘donor’ to ensure that the dependant’s needs are met. As a final resort, and in circumstances where the above are not possible, then state provision may be permitted. Nevertheless, even this latter provision is often made with reservations, given that obliging strangers to support a dependant is generally regarded by these policy-makers as morally more problematic than similar obligations being applied to those who are considered to already have significant personal ties. As a result, when providing state support, distinctions are made between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ dependants. The latter category is often refused support on the grounds that strangers do not have moral obligations to support those who are considered able to be independent and/or can be supported by families and other close relations.​[8]​ 

Of course, many from the left (and centre-left) have understood the effects and responses to dependency very differently, but in common with the right still define dependency as a ‘problem’ requiring a ‘solution’. For example, it has been argued that the dependent condition results in a person becoming highly vulnerable to exploitation – particularly within the context of a free-market system which explicitly encourages strangers to interact in a way that justifies the individual maximisation of profits via ‘zero-sum’ games.​[9]​  Faced with this predicament, the welfare state is promoted as a bulwark against the exploitation of dependent groups given that the members of such groups are, by definition, unable to ‘play the game’ because they cannot compete within a free-market system. It is in this context that the needs of the dependent group are again justifiably met. 

Taking a slightly different tack, other policy-makers have argued that the advantage of state support is precisely that it is a provision funded by a community of strangers. Obligatory ties are bound less through personal or private obligation and more through abstract appeals to ‘community’ and notions of ‘welfare rights’ and ‘collective responsibility’.​[10]​ The main argument here is that personal or private domains are in fact more likely sites for exploitation and abuse, particularly when persons are dependent upon members from within this domain. Here ‘collective responsibility’ may be located with ‘the community’ to ensure that this exploitation does not happen underpinned by the principle that dependent individuals have rights or entitlements to their welfare needs being met.​[11]​ In other words, the traditional rightist distinctions between ‘private’ and ‘public’ as separate domains of moral responsibility – with the former taking priority over the latter – are broken down which then allows for state provision.


The problem of dependency: the Disability Rights Movement

The usual starting point for understanding disability is the two models of disability juxtaposed by the Disability Rights Movement (DRM) – the medical versus the social models of disability.​[12]​ These are not the only models of disability but nevertheless represent two extremes with others occupying a middle or possibly ‘synthesised’ ground.​[13]​ However, despite the continuing debate concerning these models and their usefulness and application, it is important to first identify the parameters of the debate via the two extremes in order to understand how the ‘problem of dependency’ is generally viewed by the movement. 

The medical model of disability is seen by the DRM as an inaccurate description of disability, forming the basis of oppressive and exploitative relationships between the non-disabled and disabled people. One main-plank of the argument is that, by focusing on individual medical conditions as the causes of disability, the medical model incorrectly defines disability as a fixed condition related to the severity of a medical impairment. Moreover, it incorrectly assumes that it is this medical condition (often defined as ‘handicap’) which inevitably causes ‘dependency’ between disabled and non-disabled people. According to Barnes, the medical model links the term ‘handicapped’ with “individually-based functional limitations” which in turn falsely implies that:  “The impairment is permanent and that (the handicapped) will almost certainly remain dependent throughout their lives.”​[14]​ Consequently, negative images of disabled people (portrayed as ‘tragic victims’ ‘suffering’ from ‘deficiencies’ etc.) are promoted as distinct and ‘other’ from ‘the normal’ and able-bodied population. Disabled people, as a result of their impairment, are seen as unable to conform to standards of ‘normality’ which in turn are standards that are associated with what is defined as ‘ideal’ and ‘best’. What is ‘ideal’ and ‘best’ is then often closely associated with the values of ‘independence’ and ‘self-reliance’. 

However, the ‘social model’ promoted by the DRM offers an alternative paradigm for understanding disability by identifying the causes of disability and dependency within various social arenas. The experience of disability or handicap is not reduced to a fixed medical state relating to the severity of a particular medical impairment, but rather is an experience that is borne out of how society is organised and structured in relation to particular medical conditions. For example, according to Liachowitz:

Disability exemplifies a continuous relationship between physically impaired individuals and their social environments, so that they are disabled at some times and under some conditions, but are able to function as ordinary citizens at other times and other conditions.​[15]​

From this vantage the focus for the DRM is on citizenship, inclusion and the problems of accessibility and discriminatory barriers to participation. Therefore, instead of medical or rehabilitation polices being recommended which try to ‘adjust’ the individual condition to conform to the standards or ‘ideals’ of normality, attention is directed toward changing the social environment. It is the social environment that is perceived as discriminatory, and therefore ought to be re-structured in order to enable individuals with a particular medical condition to participate fully and on equal terms to those without impairments. 

Clearly, the above conceptions of ‘normality’ and ‘ideal’ have, quite rightly, been critiqued by the DRM. Proponents of the DRM have done much to show how rigid and dehumanising demarcations are made, by proponents of the medical model, between the medically impaired essentially ‘abnormal’ (i.e. non-ideal condition) and the unimpaired essentially ‘normal’ (i.e. ideal condition). Consequently, policy based on the medical model, focuses on changing (as much as possible) the individual in order to change what is perceived to be her essential abnormality. This either involves non-disabled experts eradicating or alleviating the impairment through medical intervention and/or providing rehabilitation programmes for individual adjustment (physical and/or psychological) to the impairment.​[16]​ The issue for the DRM is that these policies (despite their good intentions) usually serve to reinforce the exploitation and discrimination of and against disabled people – even if these policies involve considerable resources being re-distributed from the non-disabled to meet the supposed ‘special needs’ of disabled people.​[17]​ 

My main argument is that the above critique, although radically challenges the myth of medically derived dependency, by still adhering to the same pervasive ‘myth of independent living’ relies, too, on making essentialist distinctions through its own implicit use of the concepts ‘normal/abnormal’ and ‘ideal/non-ideal’. As a result, the value of independence is abstractly reified by the DRM as a fixed ideal through becoming what might be termed a ‘normalised shared social goal’ for all individuals, including people with impairments. Of course, the processes of ‘normalisation’ are conceptualised differently by the DRM as its critique refers to the social rather than medical origins of dependence. Indeed, for many working with the DRM a central part of the critique is precisely that it provides an ‘anti-essentialist’ account of the causes of disability, given that social domains are contingent upon social organisation and institutional practices rather than fixed medical conditions.​[18]​ However, my principle point is that the medical and social models (despite the above differences) socially construct dependency as a ‘social problem’ where the ideal condition as related to independence becomes the principle aim for proponents of either model.

More specifically, the social model can be understood as a more accurate description of the disabling condition in terms of the causes of disability. Nevertheless, the objective of equal participation as distinct from medical re-adjustment is only distinct in terms of its remedial solution and effect but not in terms of the problem to be solved. Consequently, ‘Independent Living’ becomes the ideal that is promoted by the DRM. Disabled people are portrayed as looking forward to, and struggling for, a future where they can participate in the same ideal/normal independent state as non-disabled already are, supposedly, enjoying. In other words, despite its social constructionist starting point proponents within the DRM still commit the same, or broadly similar, essentialist error as medical model proponents – i.e. the problem of dependency is fixed in relation to facts (whether social or medical) and that these facts cause the problem. Moreover, it is a problem that is ‘fixable’ through strategies that promote independent living (whether via social or medical adjustment). 





The mythology of independent living

As highlighted in the introduction, the ideal of independence can be understood as a myth in two senses: it is a goal that is unquestionably assumed to be (a) attainable, and (b) morally desirable. More specifically, I will argue in this section that independent living is understood as attainable and morally desirable but more often than not as a corollary to the establishment of free-market principles. 

Much of modern economic theory is rooted in principles made explicit in Adam Smith’s theories and observations concerning wealth creation and free-markets – principles which are still very much adhered to today.​[20]​ The main premise is that individuals within a free-market can act in their own self-interests in order to secure profit or personal gain, and that this leads to both individual economic independence/self-reliance and increasing prosperity for society as a whole.​[21]​ Of course, whether, or the degree to which, the latter comes about as a result of the former is a highly moot point that will not be discussed here. Instead, I will critically examine the way economic independence (whatever the effect of its implementation on society as a whole) is itself defined or socially constructed as an empirical possibility and as a moral ideal. 

Economic independence has been conceptualised in a number of ways. The first meaning is negative in character: that a person acting within a free-market is seen as not subject to the will of others because the economic contracts between individuals are voluntarily made.​[22]​ To explain the latter process further, individuals choose to engage in economic relations because of the mutual gains that are anticipated by both parties. If these gains are not anticipated as being mutual then the option of not engaging can be taken-up by the party that will not benefit. This party is then free to seek gain elsewhere. The second meaning is more positive, in that economic independence can also refer to the financial security obtained through the above exchanges. Although there are overall gainers and losers within a free-market system, the option of seeking a gain after a loss is always possible for each individual. In the long-term, so the argument goes, this will lead to increased financial security for all individuals who will learn (often by their mistakes) how to secure their interests best.​[23]​ The third meaning is that individuals are seen to be indifferent to the interests and concerns of others. This signifies economic independence in the sense that individuals do not have to calculate for others’ interests and concerns when making economic decisions. Economic independence is therefore secured through simplifying decision-making. The main argument here is that this process excludes a range of possible considerations that, if included, would likely lead to paralysis, as the permutations of each individual act for other actors’ interests and concerns are so multiple and various.​[24]​ The solution is to act in your own self-interest being understood narrowly in that it is an act that is essentially self-regarding or ‘inward-looking’.​[25]​

However, despite the ‘internal logic’ of the above, it is still possible to problematise the assumptions underpinning these arguments. This problematisation can then be used to critique the goal of independent living for disabled people. First, I will examine the assumption that a person acting within a free-market is not subject to the will of others because the economic contracts between individuals are voluntarily made. Separate from questions relating, say, to the values of freedom and responsibility in this context, there are a number of empirical issues that can be raised concerning the meaning of voluntariness as related to the free-market. Even if it is conceded that choice (based on voluntary contracts) is morally desirable within a free-market, this is only made possible after particular economic and social systems are institutionalised such that they can reasonably guarantee certain outcomes for individuals which then makes attractive this type of choice-making. In other words, individuals have to first be attracted to the possibility of certain outcomes occurring if they are to voluntarily engage in contract making. Indeed, it has been argued that the attractiveness of making choices within a free-market is almost entirely dependent upon having these outcomes secured via well-established social and economic institutions.​[26]​ 

To use an analogy: individuals are less likely to play a card-game voluntarily if they know that the rules of the game will probably not be adhered to as the game unfolds.​[27]​ The uncertainties would undermine the attractiveness of playing because certain outcomes concerning the way the game is played could not be secured. Similarly, economic contracts would less likely be voluntarily entered into if there were little possibility, for example, that the transferability of property rights from person to person was not securable in some form.​[28]​ Therefore, individuals acting freely within a free-market economy need to first be assured that the rules of voluntary exchange will be upheld and enforced which only then makes voluntary exchange attractive.

However, my argument is that when appreciating the importance of securing the possibility of free-market exchange, the use of the term ‘voluntariness’ appears misleading.  It becomes more difficult to establish that voluntariness is taking place, if it is based on the universal claim that all individuals being free to engage in contracts are not subject to another’s will and, as a result, are independent. Rather, free-market voluntariness is only made possible precisely because particular wills (conceived of individually or collectively) concerning which rules of the game are played, are implemented over others. This then ensures voluntary exchange is made attractive to particular individuals who are willing to play the game. 

Moreover, it is at this point that moral arguments can also hold regarding which set of rules reflect ‘best’, from a moral point of view, the principles or values that are promoted within any given society. Of course, it could be that these values in turn are those that would underpin the general principle that no individual should be subject to the will of another – reflecting the aspirations of the ‘independence-via-voluntary-exchange’ arguments critiqued above. However, my argument above is that the notion of voluntary exchange within a free-market by itself seems too ‘thin’ to do the work of underpinning the grander or more foundational commitment to the ‘non-subjection-of-will’ value. To implement free-market voluntary exchange, some wills at least need to be subjected in relation to which rules are played. How does this relate to disability issues and the ideal of independent living?

First, it might not be possible within existing social and economic arrangements to secure outcomes (according to the rules of the game) for certain individuals and groups. Indeed, this is a central claim for those working within the social model of disability and the Disability Rights Movement highlighted above. It is because outcomes in the way the ‘rules of the game’ are played for disabled people are not secured (as a result of discriminatory social and economic institutions) that voluntariness, so understood, is often impossible or very difficult to attain for individuals within this group. Second, this leads to moral questions concerning fairness, justice, equality and the like, which have informed many of the political debates concerning how disabled people ought to be treated. Here often the recommendation is that disabled people ought to have the same access as non-disabled people to resources that then enable voluntary exchange to take place. Third, the social problem, so defined, is that given social and political institutions are often not able to secure outcomes in the same way for disabled people as for non-disabled people then engaging in voluntary choice-making becomes less attractive for the former group. Consequently, a life of ‘welfare dependency’ for a disabled person can become more attractive and rational (in the sense of fulfilling her self-interest best), than a highly vulnerable life of engaging in free-market exchange where the rules are stacked against her.​[29]​ Finally, the policy response to this is not to change the game itself, but rather to ensure institutional mechanisms are reformed such that the outcomes for disabled people engaging in voluntary exchange can be guaranteed in the same way as they are for non-disabled people.  Indeed, recent rafts of anti-discriminatory legislation being introduced in, for example, the US, Canada and the UK are attempts at achieving precisely this outcome. 

However, the above policy responses miss the point highlighted above concerning the way voluntariness itself may have been conceptualised too narrowly. Even if the implementation of reformed institutional mechanisms works as effective guarantees so that disabled people can ‘play the game’ on the same basis as non-disabled people, both groups are still only experiencing ‘thin’ voluntariness as defined within the parameters of the free-market. Of course, the attractiveness of acting voluntarily (in this context) is spread more widely as it would include groups presently marginalised from the activities of the free-market, but the voluntariness is itself dependent upon particular wills concerning which rules of the game are played that in turn dominate over others. In short, the ‘myth of independent living’ as a corollary to implementing anti-discriminatory legislation is founded in part on the misconception that voluntariness in relation to the free-market necessarily signifies that individual wills are no longer being subjected. My contention is that although disabled people are able to play one set of rules more effectively than previously (which in turn makes the possibility of voluntary exchange more attractive and attainable) neither disabled or non-disabled people are given the choice of changing the rules of the game. 

I will now examine the second assumption that economic independence can also refer to the financial security and independence obtained through the individual engaging in free-market activities (most notably via paid work). At first glance, securing a well-paid job offers the individual financial independence: that is a route out of poverty and welfare dependence. However, this is a distorted picture of the complex and inter-related social arenas we all occupy. For example, it has been observed that since the development of public welfare provision most, if not all, people have become dependent (for their prosperity) upon the welfare state.​[30]​ Indeed, despite popular social constructions of welfare dependants being from the working/underclass, various empirical research has shown how the middle-classes, in many respects, have been the principle post-war gainers of increased state activity regarding welfare.​[31]​ Of course, many apologists of the free-market system have argued that it is precisely this type of increasing dependence that has undermined the values of individual self-reliance across social classes. Individuals are not held to account for their actions which then encourages irresponsibility, conceived of as being an abdication of the moral responsibility that individuals (and their families) be financially independent.​[32]​ 

Nevertheless, I would argue that this conception of financial independence is again very narrow. According to many commentators, modern capitalist economies require that welfare and economic systems are mutually supporting, in order to ensure that individuals have sufficient resources to efficiently engage in free-market activities.​[33]​ For example, to obtain paid work usually and increasingly necessitates that the potential worker is educated and/or trained to a particular level. It has been generally recognised (by policy-makers at least) that the free-market could not guarantee that all potential workers be educated or trained to meet the demands of employers, and more generally the demands of an increasingly competitive and technologically advanced international economy. Consequently, publicly financing some kind of state education/training system to meet these requirements is regarded as an economic as well as ‘welfare’ necessity. 

However, recognising that individuals are, as a result, ‘welfare dependent’ because of these economic necessities seriously problematises the imperative that the individual ought to be financially independent. Moreover, it is not only that most, if not all, individuals are dependent on welfare provision to secure paid employment but that modern capitalism is dependent upon the state financing institutions to ensure increasing efficiency and competitiveness. Therefore, the ideal of promoting financial independence for the individual needs to be exposed as a myth for two reasons. First, given that the highly technical world we occupy cannot flourish without some kind of publicly funded welfare provision, it is no longer tenable to argue that individuals can and ought to be financially independent by being in paid work. Second, encouraging paid work involves a commitment to some kind of financial interdependence between the individual and the state for the sake of economic development.​[34]​ 

More specifically, in relation to disability issues it might be argued that, if disabled people are to be engaged in paid work, then welfare and social systems need to be instituted which provide individuals with the necessary resources in order to enable this activity to take place. Again, this position reflects well the social model of disability as it focuses on the way society is organised or structured in relation to people with impairments. Therefore, particular systems have to be in place to ensure disabled people can participate in society on the same basis as non-disabled people, and that the state has a positive role in subsidising this financially. In other words, as with non-disabled people, to enable paid work to take place some kind of financial interdependence between the disabled individual and the state is first required. Of course, the precise requirements of disabled people and non-disabled people in relation to this financial interdependence will be different both within and between these groups. Nevertheless, it is the case for both that the demands for financial independence (linked to paid-work) is misconstrued. Given the financial support needed to equip any person with the skills and knowledge necessary to engage in paid work, then disabled people are not necessarily less dependent than non-disabled people. 

The third premise in relation to the ideal of ‘economic independence’ is that individuals are, and ought to be, indifferent to the interests or concerns of others when engaging in economic relations. Of course, for many decisions this premise is (almost) self-evidently true. If I choose to buy a pair of bright red shoes then I usually do not need to take account of (nor would I be morally obliged to take account of) other people’s interests and concerns. To use the language of J.S. Mill the choice is ‘self’ regarding and not ‘other’ regarding and therefore can and ought to be made without reference to other people’s interests.​[35]​ This is even if another person might dislike my choice of shoes and would prefer not to see me walking about in them.​[36]​ 

However, this does not mean that all economic decisions are, and ought to be, made in this way – i.e. without taking account other people’s interests or concerns. It might be argued that our interests and concerns are often, albeit not always, overlapping. For example, often communitarian commentators (past and present) have emphasised the value of establishing common ideals and shared ‘conceptions of the good’ as a basis for promoting individual interests.​[37]​ In other words, individuals do not exist atomistically or entirely separately from others, but rather that the ends of each individual are, in some way, inextricably bound-up with the ends of the group. Recently, more ostensibly liberal or individual-based political philosophers have acknowledged the importance of collective goods when promoting values such as individual autonomy. For example, it has been argued that the so-called conflict between individual freedom and the meeting of other people’s needs is largely illusory.​[38]​ More specifically, the development of ‘comprehensive’ individual goods (i.e. relating to goals which incorporate various facets of a person’s life) might be thought of as dependent upon the existence of ‘social forms’ that must in turn incorporate the promotion of ‘collective goods’.​[39]​ 

Other arguments have taken a different tack but have still emphasised the inter-related nature of individual moral decision making. For example, it has been highlighted how in modern societies the consequences of many individuals acting in a particular way might be so detrimental to society as a whole, that these acts collectively could be thought of as morally wrong.​[40]​ This is even though each individual act (if considered individually) is understood as morally acceptable. In other words, given the complex social realities we all occupy, it is not only unattainable that individual can act autonomously and at the same time be completely disinterested with the needs or interests of others. It is also morally untenable, given the significant consequences that many individuals acting in their own self-interest can have on modern societies as whole. Of course, this makes contemporary decision-making highly problematic as the empirical and moral realities we occupy become even more complex. However, these realities cannot be avoided simply by insisting that individuals can and ought to act without having to take account of more collective interests. Instead, individual and social relations need to be seen as more inter-related which then will provide a basis for individual as well as collective decision-making. 

Again, more specifically in relation to disability issues, recognising the interdependent nature of individual and collective decision-making highlights further the myth of independent living. It can be seen from the above, that the particular construction of ‘dependence’ as a social problem being confined to disabled people (with ‘independent living’ as an ideal being enjoyed by non-disabled people) distorts both the social and moral arenas we all occupy. In short, nobody can and ought to consider herself as independent and yet independence is championed as an ideal. Of course, it can been argued from different perspectives that the reasons for this type of distortion are related to the social functions of the myth of independence.​[41]​ So, from a Marxist perspective the myth might be understood as a function of the way capitalist interests are furthered through liberal ideological underpinnings that promote the ‘individual rational actor’ within the free-market, as an ideal.​[42]​ On a different tack, feminists have done much to ‘de-bunk’ the ‘independence of the rational actor’ as a masculinised ideal – an ideal which is understood as degrading or under-valuing more relational or reciprocally-based moral and social obligations which might be characterised as feminine. 

In any event, the final question is – how might the above distortions be rectified (whatever their causes) in ways that are enabling for disabled people? Whilst space does not permit me to answer this question in any great depth, I would suggest that there are three broad principles, or rather ‘acknowledgements’, that could be made which would underpin any detailed application of such a process.

First, it needs to be acknowledged that the very direct and unavoidable interdependency subjectively experienced by people with disabilities (in both personal and social relations) can be used to teach and equip the wider community with a much deeper understanding of these interdependencies experienced by all people. For many non-disabled people the reality of interdependency is not one that is subjectively acknowledged because the myth of independence suggests very powerfully that non-disabled people are ideally situated – being perceived as independent and self-reliant. Disabled people have a positive and central role to play in challenging this myth.

Second, acknowledging the experiences of disabled people (and recognising that these experiences might be ‘better informed’ regarding the interdependent character of our lives) would, I believe, provide the basis of a more coherent articulation of the political demands being made by the Disability Rights Movement. Rather than promoting the myth of independent living as the monistic ideal for all people,​[43]​ a more multi-layered appreciation of the different interdependencies experienced by everyone could instead be celebrated. It is in this context that differences in physical and intellectual capabilities could be more fully embraced as a hallmark of the diverse and rich nature of interdependent relations. 
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